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The Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) in 2011 emphasized the 
importance of gender equality and diversity in the U.S. armed forces, placing gender 
integration and inclusion on the Navy’s priority list. The retention rates of female Navy 
officers tend to be lower than the rates of their male counterparts. Recent studies focused 
on better understanding the factors that affect female retention to improve gender 
integration and inclusion in the Navy. With the number of dual-military couples on the 
rise, and with women more likely than men to be married to a service member, this study 
examines retention and performance of female Navy officers in a dual-military marriage. 
Using data on Navy officers commissioned between 1999 and 2003, results of a 
multivariate analysis indicate that women in a dual-military marriage tend to stay in the 
Navy at a lower rate than do women married to a civilian spouse. However, women in a 
dual-military marriage who stay beyond 10 years of service show higher performance 
than do their male counterparts. These findings suggest that the Navy needs to address 
work-life balance to increase retention rates of female Navy officers in a dual-military 
marriage, and subsequently benefit from their higher performance later. 
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Individuals in our society face constant changes in their lifestyles. Every now and 
then, new generations of people—from the “GI Generation” to “Generation Z”—are 
identified based on their lifestyles and their influences (Novak, n.d.). Each of these 
generations shares collective experiences and similar ideals. These influences and their 
outcomes do not spare military personnel. Indeed, one of the emerging trends over the 
past few decades is a family model with both parents working. These so-called “dual-
career” families have been researched broadly. For example, in a Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) thesis published nearly 35 years ago, Henderson (1981) analyzed the 
differences among dual-career couples and single- and dual-income families within the 
U.S. Coast Guard. As the number of dual-career couples in the U.S. has continued to 
increase in recent years, so has the number of “dual-military” couples for which both 
partners serve in the military (Department of Defense, 2015a). Disproportionately, more 
married female than married male officers are part of dual-military families, 39.2% and 
5.1%, respectively (Department of Defense, 2015a). This disproportion is of particular 
interest with respect to female retention because it opens the door for policy intervention. 
In an attempt to improve the demographic diversity of its force following the 
mission to “attract, develop, and retain a high-quality, diverse workforce that values a 
culture of inclusion” and to achieve gender integration most effectively, the U.S. Navy 
has been trying to recruit, train, and retain more women (Navy Personnel Command, 
2016b). Recent policies have shown success; however, the Military Leadership Diversity 
Commission (MLDC) in 2011 still found that women were underrepresented in senior 
leadership positions. One of the reasons identified was female retention. Recent studies 
have shown that female officers are less likely than their male counterparts to stay in the 
Navy (Mundell, 2016). Among the many factors that explain that outcome are quality of 
life and work–life balance, which have become a focus in studies on personnel retention. 
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Quality-of-life issues also affect the labor-supply decisions of dual-military 
couples. More specifically, the retention behavior and job performance outcomes of 
female officers in such marriages could be an indicator of deficient quality of life and the 
need to deliver policies aimed at improving the integration and inclusion of female 
officers. This thesis seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of factors affecting 
quality of life and examines the retention behavior and job performance of female 
officers in dual-military marriages, an increasing trend in the Navy officer corps.  
This thesis takes a quantitative approach in comparing the retention and  
performance of female U.S. Navy officers in a dual-military marriage with that of their 
male counterparts as well as female Navy officers not in dual-military marriages (either 
married to civilians or single). Only heterosexual dual-military marriages are covered in 
this thesis as the available dataset contains only one same-sex couple. As same-sex 
marriage has become legal and more common in recent years, research with more recent 
data could address specifics of same-sex dual-military couples.  
Using a regression analysis approach, this study examines Navy officer cohorts 
commissioned between 1999 and 2003, followed annually. The working hypothesis is 
that the retention and job performance of female officers in a dual-military marriage 
differ significantly from that of officers in the comparison groups due to additional 
demands the military lifestyle places on dual-military couples.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The Navy is interested in examining the retention behavior and job performance 
of female officers in a dual-military marriage to better understand the factors that affect 
their labor-supply decisions and to incorporate this knowledge into a comprehensive 
manpower strategy to increase the level of gender integration and inclusion in the Navy. 
The primary research question in the present study is as follows: 
• How do the retention and job performance of female Navy officers in a 
dual-military marriage compare with the retention and job performance of 
other Navy officers?  
The secondary research questions are as follows: 
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• How do the retention and job performance of female Navy officers in a 
dual-military marriage differ from the retention and job performance of 
other Navy officers by gender, marital status, Navy community, 
commissioning source, and other factors?  
• Based on the findings, what are the implications for improving U.S. Navy 
manpower and personnel practices, programs, and policies, in general, as 
well as the efforts of gender integration and inclusion, in particular? 
C. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II provides a background on 
dual-military couples and talent management in the U.S. Navy. Chapter III describes the 
available data, introduces the quantitative method, and details the models used.  
Chapter IV presents the results of the regression models. Finally, Chapter V provides a 
brief summary of the study, formulates conclusions, and offers recommendations for 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
This study examines the retention and job performance of female Navy officers in 
a dual-military marriage and the possible connection between work–life balance demands 
and their experiences as Navy officers. Dual-military couples are a subset of the Navy 
population that faces specific challenges regarding work–life balance and quality of life 
compared with other couples in which only one of the spouses is a service member. At 
the same time, one can assume that professional performance is somehow linked to those 
challenges. This chapter discusses demographic statistics to better understand the position 
of dual-military couples in today’s Navy. 
1. Talent Management, Performance Evaluation, and Productivity of 
Naval Officers 
High-performing, highly skilled, and well-educated personnel with excellent 
professional perspectives are desired in the labor market as well as in the military. 
Representing the supply side and putting industry in the demand role, these high-quality 
persons likely garner many offers and career incentives in the labor market. The U.S. 
Navy must offer comparable incentives to compete with industry. In 2015, the 
Department of the Navy launched a series of talent-management initiatives (Department 
of the Navy, 2015). With these initiatives, the Navy expressed its intention to win the 
“war for talent” by identifying high-potential personnel, evaluating and predicting their 
performance, and establishing valuable incentives to recruit and retain them (Navy 
Personnel Command, 2016b).  
The most desirable employees in an organization can be identified by their 
productivity or by an even broader concept, their quality. Clearly, a person’s quality as 
well as productivity is difficult to measure. Navy officers periodically receive 
performance evaluations, so-called fitness reports (FITREPs), which assess their 
performance in loose description of traits and scaled ratings. Performance ratings in 
FITREPs appear to be reliable variables for analysis and are easily identified. However, 
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these ratings could be influenced by supervisor biases, and they do not represent the full 
productivity of a person. Still, researchers often draw conclusions about the overall 
performance of officers from these ratings (Mehay & Bowman, 2005; Maugeri, 2016; 
Ellison, 2014). 
The performance evaluation is a widely accepted approach to quantifying a 
person’s job performance. Nevertheless, research suggests that performance management 
(PM) ratings are not a reliable predictor of actual performance. More importantly, ratings 
have shown no correlation with business unit performance (Corporate Executive Board 
Corporate Leadership Council, 2012). The main reason why traditional performance 
appraisals fail to effectively improve performance seems to relate largely to the design of 
these appraisal systems—which rely on prescribed schedules, requirements to follow 
steps in a process, and other factors that lack flexibility (Pulakos & O’Leary, 2011). In an 
attempt to address these issues, high-profile companies, such as Adobe and Microsoft, 
eliminated their formal PM process. Despite not providing any increased performance for 
a business, PM ratings still offer a useful tool to compare persons for pay increases, 
promotions, and other personnel actions. While they do not drive business success, 
performance ratings in a highly structured, formalized process are still commonly used in 
the military.  
Identifying the productivity—or measurable quality—of a Navy officer depends 
on the definitions of quality and the value of performance in an organization. Normally, 
there is no variable called “productivity.” In addition to traditional performance 
measurements, productivity consists of other factors such as personality, family concerns, 
and external support. The actual correlation of productivity and performance ratings has 
been discussed qualitatively in previous research, but few, if any, studies have attempted 
to examine this correlation quantitatively. The key underlying problem involves 
measuring actual productivity. Different approaches to quantify productivity have been 
pursued over the years, yet none is compelling or considered superior to other 
approaches. Thus, researchers often use indicator variables and assume there is a high 
correlation between them and actual productivity. Mehay and Bowman (2005), for 
example, employ the terms “productivity” and “performance ratings” synonymously. 
 7 
This particular study, which looks at marital status and productivity, also relies heavily 
on rating measurements to determine productivity (Mehay & Bowman, 2005). 
2. Female Officer Retention and Dual-Military Couples 
In 1973, the United States abolished the draft and established the All-Volunteer 
Force (AVF). This significant shift toward staffing the military was a result of a changing 
national landscape politically and socially as well as a new perspective on national 
security. One major issue addressed by the AVF was the growing concern among U.S. 
citizens about the fairness of military conscription (Rostker, 2006). Another issue was 
related to the increasing need for highly qualified, professional, career-minded personnel 
who were capable of operating and maintaining more modern technology in the military. 
The AVF was intended in part to enhance the capabilities and professionalism of service 
members by enabling the armed forces to invest more time and resources in their training 
and education (Rostker, 2006).  
As members stayed longer in the military after transition to the AVF, the services 
soon recognized that the retention decisions of officers and enlisted personnel often 
depended heavily on the family’s happiness with military life (Clever & Segal, 2013).  
Thus, the wellbeing of military families became an increasingly more significant concern 
of the services as the years progressed. As the Department of Defense (2015b) has shown 
in its Table D-18, service members today stay longer in service than they did in 1973, and 
they are older on average. Table D-14 of the same source showed that the percentage of 
married enlisted also increased from 1973 to 2014. It is assumed the percentage of 
married officers increased, too—although the magnitude may not have been as significant 
given that, in general, officers enter service older than enlisted personnel. Rising numbers 
of married service members and dependent children carried additional burdens and 
demands on their families’ lives compared with their civilian counterparts.  
Among the many different demands on service members, the requirement to move 
relatively often over long distances over the course of a career is expected. Labor 
economists refer to the dynamics and decisions made in connection with moving and job 
change as a family-migration decision and describe the employee or spouse as a tied 
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mover, someone who sacrifices better job opportunities at the current location to move 
with the family, or a tied stayer, someone who sacrifices better job opportunities at 
another location to stay with the family (Borjas, 2008, p. 331). In general, family 
migration is associated with higher total earnings for a family as a whole because a 
family unit tends to move voluntarily when total earnings are better elsewhere. Other 
factors, such as a more enjoyable job or better quality of life, further influence a moving 
decision. Apparently, the effect on a family’s total earnings does not hold true for 
military families because the post-migration earnings of a military member’s civilian 
spouse are often lower. While the member’s earnings depend on military rank and likely 
stay the same after the move, the trailing spouse’s income is often lower than before the 
move (Borjas, 2008). Research identifies an acceptance of such earning penalties in 
military families—and mostly by the civilian women moving with their military 
husbands—resulting potentially in deliberate unemployment or under-employment of the 
civilian spouses (Harrell, Lim, Castaneda, & Golinelli, 2004).  
Military families also face certain unique challenges by so-called quality-of-life 
issues. For example, research shows that children in a military family tend to experience 
a performance drop in school, depending on the number of deployments and deployment 
length of the military parent (Arkes, 2015). A non-working spouse can compensate for a 
lot of these issues (Brummond, 2015) but has to further sacrifice her or his own 
development and career, as Hosek, Asch, Fair, Martin, and Mattock (2002) have 
described.  
Previous studies further indicate a significant earnings gap between military 
families with a husband in the military compared with families in which a wife is serving 
in the military. Little and Hisnanick (2007) and Hosek et al. (2002) have shown that a 
tied-mover spouse tends to work less and for lower wages and that the earnings gap is 
smaller when the tied-moving spouse is the husband. In general, they revealed that 
military families typically earn less than civilian ones, and military spouses on average 
account for roughly 50 percent of their lower family earnings. Because both partners in a 
dual-military marriage are employed and are paid according to their military rank, the 
earnings penalty is probably lower, on average, than it is for families in which just one 
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partner is in the military. At the same time, one could argue that at least one partner in a 
dual-military marriage sacrifices his or her career progress (a tied mover or a tied stayer), 
essentially accepting lower lifetime earnings.  
Earnings differences between men and women in working couples are well 
established in previous research (Hertz, 1986; Hardill & Watson, 2004). Further, in dual-
military couples, men usually plan to stay in service and pursue careers earlier, thus 
accumulating higher pay and facing better career opportunities (Teplitzky, Thomas, & 
Nogami, 1988). Men are more likely to have graduate education or to obtain it through 
their careers; thus, they accumulate higher human capital and are more likely to progress 
through the ranks (Mundell, 2016). Another approach to explain earning differences is 
the idea of assertive mating, which assumes that men are more likely to marry women 
with lower levels of education (Mare, 1991). Based on these research findings, an 
imbalance between men and women is expected in their contributions to the overall 
outcome of military families. Additionally, labor economics theory suggests that a dual-
earning household often moves with the dislocation of the higher-earning partner, putting 
the other partner in the position of a tied mover, sacrificing existing job opportunities for 
the good of the family. Thus, on average, in a heterosexual marriage, wives are less likely 
than husbands to find optimal conditions for pursuing their careers (Little & Hisnanick, 
2007). 
From a military perspective, all of the challenges put on the family by one partner 
being a service member at least “doubles” for dual-military families. Deployments of at 
least one parent at a given time are more likely; thus, schooling issues for the children 
become more likely. While having one partner deployed, the family or household 
responsibilities for the other partner increase significantly. Moving one partner for career 
purposes without assigning the other partner to the same location or a close duty station 
puts added stress on all family members. These stressors, or “shocks,” compel all family 
members to react. Usually, the partner who contributes less to the family’s financial 
income deals mainly with such “shocks” and potentially sacrifices one’s career progress 
for the family’s sake. As previously discussed, the female partner in a heterosexual 
marriage is more likely to be that person. Notably, the Navy has recently attempted to 
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reduce the impact of such shocks on dual-military couples by ordering detailers to give 
top priority to finding collocated assignments for Navy partners once their partners are 
about to be transferred (NAVPERSCOM, 2015). This policy also orders the Navy 
detailers to cooperate with the detailers of other services if the spouse is in another 
service and to evaluate the possibility of assignment of both partners in a dual-military 
marriage to the same location. 
Being in a dual-military marriage further affects any retention decision of these 
members. When Mundell (2016) studied the retention decisions of female junior officers 
in the Navy, he found that their retention rates tended to be lower than those of their male 
counterparts. The exceptions were for women who obtained graduate education, were 
allowed to transfer laterally into other communities, or were married.  
About 40% of married women in the Navy are living in a dual-military marriage 
(see Table 2); the Navy may address women’s retention rates by further supporting dual-
military families. Indeed, the Navy has been striving to provide such support and to more 
fully understand the dynamics within these families. 
3. Demographic Statistics 
The Department of Defense’s (2015a) report, 2014 Demographics: Profile of the 
Military Community, presents statistics on members and families in the military 
community.  As of 2014, active-duty military personnel comprised more than 1.3 million 
enlistees and officers, which represent 37.3% of military personnel. The Navy, as the 
second-largest service, accounted for roughly 321,000 active-duty personnel (50.5% of 
total Navy personnel), including 54,440 officers (23.1% in officer corps). Of these 
officers, 17%, or 9,248, were women, and 83%, or 45,192, were men (Department of 
Defense, 2015a, p. 20). 
Table 1 shows the proportion of married military members in 2014 who were in 
dual-military couples, in which both partners served on active duty in a military branch.  
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Table 1.   Percentage of Married Active-Duty Enlisted Members and Officers 
in Dual-Military Marriages by Service Branch, 2014 
 
Source: Department of Defense (2015a). 2014 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community. 
Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Military Community and Family 
Policy.  
As presented in the table 8.0% of married officers in the Navy were in a dual-
military marriage as of 2014, which is lower than in the Army and in the Air Force as 
well as lower than the DOD average (10.5%), but still higher than in the Marine Corps 
(6.3%). In relation to all Navy active-duty officers, officers in dual-military marriages 
rose from 4.6% in 2005 to 5.4% in 2014 (Department of Defense, 2015a, p. 51). 
Table 2 shows the percentage of married active-duty service members in dual-
military marriages.  
Table 2.   Percentage of Married Active-Duty Members in Dual-Military 
Marriages by Service Branch and Gender, 2014 
 
Source: Department of Defense (2015a). 2014 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community. 
Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Military Community and Family 
Policy.  
As seen in Table 2, a relatively high proportion of married female personnel 
(officers and enlistees combined) in the Navy—slightly over 39%—were in dual-military 
marriages as of 2014. This compares with 5.5% of their male counterparts, a striking 
difference of over 33 percentage points. Stated differently, married women in the Navy 
are over seven times more likely than their male counterparts to be in dual-military 
marriages. The differences in these rates, by gender, are substantial across all services, 
particularly in the Marine Corps, in which married women are over 11 times more likely 
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than men to be part of dual-military marriages (Department of Defense, 2015a). It should 
be noted that comparable data on Navy officers in 2014 could not be found. 
As previously described, the present study focuses exclusively on Navy officers, 
and available statistics suggest that a significant portion of these officers, particularly 
women, are in dual-military marriages. Although dual-career couples have become 
increasingly common across the general population and throughout the world, when 
careers involve military service, the demands of working life and family life are more 
prone to clash (Segal, 1986; Long, 2008). The following discussion addresses some of the 
challenges confronting partners of dual-military marriages. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To build the research framework for this study, this section reviews a 2012 
RAND study on retention of female officers in the Navy, a 2013 paper on marital status 
and Navy officer productivity from the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), and a related 
study on female Navy officer performance conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) in 2016. The review focuses mainly on the purpose, methodology, and results of 
each previous study. 
1. Female Officers and Dual-Military Families 
In 2013, the Department of the Navy issued the 21st Century Sailor and Marine 
Initiative to maximize force readiness to meet the current and future demands of the 
Navy. Five focus areas were established: readiness, safety, physical fitness, inclusion, and 
continuum of service (Department of the Navy, 2013). Inclusion refers to equal 
opportunity approaches to strengthen diversity and to foster different perspectives and 
expertise in the Navy and Marine Corps. 
The Under-Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness tasked the RAND 
Corporation to update previous research on career progression of women in the military 
(Department of Defense, 1999). The findings were published by Asch, Miller, and 
Malchiodi (2012), focusing on gender and minority differences in retention and 
promotion between white males and other racial groups and between males and females. 
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The authors emphasized their aim to describe these differences by race, ethnicity, and 
gender, not to identify the reasons for those differences.  
Asch et al. (2012) studied male and female retention and promotion to all ranks 
using a Proxy-PERSTEMPO data file provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC), a longitudinal record of active-duty personnel from 1988 through 2010 across 
all services. The study found that female retention (expressed as “Retention as rank O-1 
through O-5”) was lower than for white men—except for black women, whose retention 
rates did not differ from that of men. These findings are roughly consistent with earlier 
RAND studies.  
Retention and promotion to all ranks were considered milestones in officers’ 
careers (see Table 3). Officers who did not become eligible for particular milestones due 
to leaving the service were not included in the models. Retention was measured as 
conditional upon achieving the previous grade and up to eligibility for the next 
promotion.  
Table 3.  Dependent Variables Used by Asch et al. (2012) 
Source: Asch, B. J., Miller, T., & Malchiodi, A. (2012). A new look at 
gender and minority differences in officer career progression in the 
military. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
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Figure 1 shows the applied model, wherein j is one of the 10 career outcomes 
shown in Table 3, and i is the individual officer. D is a set of key variables: dummy 
variables for race, ethnicity, and gender. X is a set of control variables including marital 
status, education, occupational group, and deployment experience. 
Figure 1.  Model Used by Asch et al. (2012) to Estimate Career Progression. 
The study also found that women across all ranks and regardless of ethnicity were 
less likely than white males to promote to O-2, O-3, and O-4. Furthermore, once these 
women reached the O-4 level, they were less likely to promote to O-6. The one exception 
to lower promotion rates, the authors identified, was for black women, who promoted at 
nearly the same rate to O-3 as white males.  
One of the study’s limitations, as Asch et al. (2012, p. xiv) admit, is the “myriad 
[of] other possible contributors to differences in career progression” for which they did 
not control. This thesis aims to shed light on some of these other contributors—
specifically on how marital status may affect job performance. 
The CNA study by Kraus, Parcell, Reese, and Shuford (2013) examined the 
retention of female officers in the Navy’s surface warfare and aviation communities. The 
authors aimed to identify explanatory factors in the lower retention and promotion rates 
among women and racial/ethnic minority groups compared to their white male 
counterparts. Kraus et al. (2013, p. 3) used data from the Navy’s Officer Master File 
(OMF), received annually by CNA since the mid-1970s, and modeled retention 
probability as a function of “personal and military career characteristics.” Specifically, 
the regression model for retention at three to nine years of commissioned service (YCS 
3–9) controlled for two groups of variables: demographic variables (race, ethnicity, 
marital and dependent status, and college major) and Navy career variables (year-group 
cohort, accession source, lateral into SWO, nuclear subspecialty, and ship type). Two 
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additional variables were included to reflect a ship’s crew composition and to compare 
military and civilian pay as an indicator for civilian job opportunities.  
While some factors affected male and female retention similarly (e.g., college 
major, accession source, nuclear subspecialty), the authors found some factors (e.g., 
number of dependents and marital status) affected female and male officers’ retention 
rates differently. While married male surface warfare officers (SWOs) retain at a higher 
rate than single men, married female SWOs do not retain at a significantly different rate 
than do their single peers. Kraus et al. (2013) explained this effect was the result of a 
small sample size in their study, but their model did not differentiate between SWO 
losses from the Navy and SWO losses into other communities (lateral transfers). They 
further noted that female officers were more likely to be married to other service 
members (i.e., dual-military marriages), and career-management considerations were 
more likely to influence career decisions such as lateral transfers. 
In an attempt to broaden the research on female retention to a wider spectrum of 
communities, Mundell’s (2016) NPS thesis examines the retention and promotion of 
female junior officers in the Navy. Using data on retention to the minimum service 
requirement (MSR) of six years, retention to 10 years of service, and promotion to O-4, 
and controlling for demographics, professional, transition, and cohort year variables, 
Mundell examined factors likely to explain observed differences in retention and 
promotion to O-4 rates between female and male Navy officers. He found that women are 
less likely than men to stay in the Navy at six and 10 years of service but have promotion 
rates no different than men. 
Table 4 shows the MSR retention separated for female and male Navy officers. 
Similarly, Table 5 shows the 10-year retention for female and male Navy officers. 
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Table 4.   MSR Retention Probit Model Results for Women and Men: 
Marginal Effects 
 
Source: Mundell, D. (2016). Study of Female Junior Officer Retention and Promotion in 
the U.S. Navy (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School). 
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Table 5.   Ten-Year Retention Probit Model Results for Women and Men: 
Marginal Effects 
 
Source: Mundell, D. (2016). Study of Female Junior Officer Retention and Promotion in 
the U.S. Navy (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School). 
Tables 4 and 5 show the MSR and 10-year retention regression results for female 
and male officers. Clearly, the retention rates between women and men are significantly 
different in both models. At MSR, women are 2.7% less likely to retain than their male 
counterparts; at 10 years, the gap increased to 12% less likely.  
Table 6 shows the promotion to O-4 estimates for both genders.  
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Table 6.   Promotion to O-4 Probit Model Results for Women and Men: 
Marginal Effects 
 
Source: Mundell, D. (2016). Study of Female Junior Officer Retention and Promotion in 
the U.S. Navy (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School). 
In the current system of promotion and retention in the Navy, promotion can lead 
to retention. Consequently, for Navy officers who stayed at least 10 years, Mundell 
(2016) found a mean retention probability of 76.5% for women and 77.3% for men 
among those who were promoted to O-4. Such similarities between women and men 
suggest that the Navy’s policies and incentives are working effectively. Interestingly, a 
successful lateral transfer by six years of service had a significant positive impact on 
promotion to O-4 for both genders. Service members who were deemed high-quality and, 
thus, allowed to transfer laterally rather than being forced out, seemed more satisfied and 
tried to stay in the Navy longer. 
The findings in Mundell (2016) support earlier research showing that the overall 
retention rate for female Navy officers tends to be lower than that of their male 
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counterparts. This gap increases from the MSR to 10 YOS. However, officers who obtain 
graduate education, are married, or have dependent children by six YOS are more likely 
to pursue a full career in the Navy. Mundell (2016) speculates that married officers likely 
stay longer in service to support their families while considering lateral transfers more 
often to improve their quality of life or work-life balance. 
This thesis uses the same dataset Mundell used, supplemented by another dataset 
providing the dual-military information. Mundell showed that promotion to O-4 and 
retention can be modeled from this dataset and yield meaningful results. Furthermore, the 
chosen variable groups—demographics, marital information, Navy community, 
commissioning source, and cohort year—provide valuable insight into retention and 
promotion decisions. As both promotion and retention indicate performance, this study 
uses the same approach to estimate performance and identify factors affecting military 
job performance. 
Female service members—in a prevalent, more traditional role—still need to 
address family issues more often than men. In a RAND survey, Gates, Zellman, and 
Moini (2006) found that parents expressed willingness to leave the military because of 
inadequate childcare arrangements. For parents of pre-school-aged children, they suggest 
that income level has an impact on unmet child-care needs. As both parents contribute to 
the income, dual-military families are the least likely to experience unmet needs. 
However, dual-military families are more likely to report unmet preferences when having 
school-aged children. Unmet preferences eventually lead to a retention decision 
unfavorable for the military. According to Gates et al. (2006), 21% of the surveyed 
parents stated that it was likely or very likely that they would leave the military because 
of child-care issues. Moreover, the authors found that dual-military families are 
especially prone to leave the military because of child-care issues.  
Other aspects of dual-military families are also particularly stressful for women. 
In a Master’s thesis, Johnson (1987, p. viii), defining stressors, noted that, even though 
women in his study characterized their marriages as egalitarian, they were “still 
ultimately responsible for childrearing and housekeeping. Husbands [were] not doing 
their fair share.” This account may have changed a bit since the 1980s, although the 
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military usually cultivates a traditional worldview with traditional values. Consequently, 
women in dual-military marriages rank their roles as mother first, followed by wife and 
Navy officer.  
Occasional stressors, or family shocks, hit the dual-military family harder than 
other family types because both parents work on very rigid military schedules and both 
parents are prone to be deployed, leaving the staying parent responsible for all family and 
career issues given the geographical distance between spouses’ duty stations. All of these 
stressors impact the job performance of service members. In its attempt to retain talent 
and to have officers performing at their best, the Navy needs to understand the stressors 
as well as their actual impact on performance and retention of service members in dual-
military families. 
2. Productivity and Performance 
The present study aims to examine the relationship between dual-military 
marriage and a Navy officer’s productivity. Although previous studies of marital status 
and job productivity may include dual-income couples, few have examined the military 
aspects of marital status and a person’s general performance. In exploring wage-earning 
differences between genders, Mehay and Bowman (2005) tested concepts from labor 
economics with findings in the field of military manpower by looking for evidence of 
higher performance ratings and earlier promotion (which corresponds with labor 
economics’ well-established wage premium for married men) among male service 
members. 
In their paper, Mehay and Bowman (2005) found that married Navy officers 
receive a marriage premium over single men. They sought to analyze “the existence and 
magnitude of job-productivity differentials between married and single males” (Mehay & 
Bowman, 2005, p. 74). Although wage premiums for married men are well-documented 
in labor economics, related studies over the years have come to differing conclusions. 
Mehay and Bowman (2005) appropriately addressed these conflicting results, affirmed 
existing knowledge, broadened the scope toward the military environment, and managed 
to reinforce an already-known mechanism using a large dataset of the U.S. Navy. 
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The authors assumed that performance ratings and promotions reflect productivity 
and argued their point effectively when presenting evidence and interpreting results. They 
relied heavily on two performance indicators: recommendation for accelerated promotion 
(RAP) scores and promotion outcomes. In earlier research (Neumann, Mattson, & 
Abraham, 1989), the RAP score showed significant variation and was validated as a 
predictor of job performance. Nevertheless, one could also claim that such ratings and 
promotions are essentially rewards for more than mere job productivity, and they may be 
influenced by external or intervening factors—including individual career perspectives, 
personal traits, superiors’ limitations when producing personnel evaluations, or 
institutional biases. Consequently, although Mehay and Bowman (2005) do not 
distinguish between performance indicators and productivity, applying the terms 
synonymously, it is important to recognize that performance ratings can be influenced by 
a number of factors other than productivity. Stated differently, performance ratings may 
not reflect actual productivity, but more importantly, a person’s positive contributions to 
an organization include more than some determination of that person’s productivity.   
A person’s aptitude is reflected not only by performance but also by “soft 
factors.” More qualitatively, Brummond (2015) discussed job commitment, which is 
supposed to be one crucial aspect of an officer’s job performance. The author utilized a 
DMDC survey from 2008 to explore the term “greedy institution” (Segal, 1986) as it 
relates to the military in wartime, as well as military families, and its effect on work 
attitudes. Institutional greediness in these circumstances is described as a state that 
severely limits the time and energy one can spend on other activities or aspects of life. 
Brummond (2015) stated that the extraordinary family benefits of the military make the 
institution less greedy and affect service members’ commitment positively. 
The author found significantly lower commitment among women in dual-military 
marriages and explained that, when both partners work in high-demand jobs, household 
obligations still tend to fall more on the woman. Using relatively new data from 2008, 
Brummond (2015) still found traditional role models, even in dual-military marriages 
when the military occupational demand was high on both partners. This finding supports 
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the assumption that women in a dual-military marriage show lower performance if the 
correlation between commitment and performance holds true. 
Evidence found in Brummond’s (2015) study demonstrates that the military’s 
greediest aspect is separation, and separation has the greatest impact on job commitment. 
At the same time, mobility and separation put a tremendous amount of stress on military 
children because they tend to have more difficulties readapting (Ender, 2000). Thus, this 
thesis expects to find parents showing less commitment, especially when experiencing 
geographic separation. Actual results suggest a contrary view: those with children have 
significantly higher career commitment.  
In an earlier study, Lakhani and Gade (1992, p. 153) showed a similar effect: 
retention was positively correlated with “perceived spouse’s intention to stay in the 
Army, family income, family size, career commitment, and job satisfaction.” As 
commitment is part of an officer’s performance, this thesis controls for parental and 
separation stressors when examining performance.  
3. Performance Modelling 
Military performance measures usually include FITREP data. Mehay and 
Bowman (2005) as well as Maugeri (2016) developed metrics of on-the-job performance 
from FITREP data. 
Maugeri used the early promotion (EP) recommendation at 72 and 120 months, 
derived as continuous variables, defined as the number of early promotion 
recommendations officers receive in their first six or 10 years of service, respectively. 
The number of FITREPs in these timeframes may differ from one officer to another 
because, in addition to the annual FITREPs, an officer gets a FITREP when she or he 
changes duty station or when the reporting senior officer changes. To obtain comparable 
information, Maugeri (2016) calculated the percentage of recommendations from the 
total number of FITREPs received by an officer. 
Little evidence was found for a marriage advantage in Maugeri’s research. Only 
in the O-4 promotion probability model did married unrestricted line (URL) officers have 
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a significantly higher promotion rate when compared with single officers. However, for 
restricted line and staff officers, as well as in the two EP models, no differences were 
found between married and unmarried officers. Maugeri’s models did not account for 
dual-military marriages or disruptions in family life that may further affect individual 
performance—which is ultimately the focus of this study. 
The type of model described by Maugeri (2016) has been frequently used to 
analyze military personnel data (Karakaya, 2011; Mundell, 2016; Clark, 2016). Datasets 
available for this study provide similar variables and information content. Thus, this 
study uses such a model to investigate job performance differences between dual-military 
officers and other officers. 
C. SUMMARY 
A number of studies have indicated that having a family while serving in the 
military affects the retention decisions of military members, and more so for married 
couples and parents (Segal & Segal, 2006; Burrell, Adams, Durand, & Castro, 2006). 
Previous research suggests that a dual-military marriage status tends to place an increased 
burden on a service member’s family life over that of a traditional military family with 
one civilian spouse. Colocation issues, frequent deployment of both partners, and 
schooling for children, among other work-life factors, can have a great impact on a dual-
military partner’s quality of life. Sacrificing career progress for one’s family seems more 
likely in a dual-military marriage, as Brummond (2015) suggests by highlighting career 
commitment. 
The Navy’s talent-management initiative strives to develop and retain service 
members demonstrating the highest performance. In a first step, the Navy needs to 
identify these “high performers,” which leads ultimately to a ratings system such as 
FITREP scores. The underlying difficulty is in defining productivity and then 
determining how to measure it. Typically, indicator variables related to promotion and 
retention are often used as substitutes for productivity. The present study needs to follow 
the same approach as available data rely on the existing FITREP system.  
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None of the current literature aims to define or identify the performance of a 
household, that is, the aggregated performance of both partners. This study uses the same 
type of variables to indicate individual performance, develops aggregate metrics for the 
performance of dual-military couples, and compares them with performance scores of 
single Navy officers. In a second step, the present study examines how these performance 
ratings behave over time, in an effort to find whether one or both partners in a dual-
military marriage change their performance significantly, and tries to identify the reasons 
for such a change. 
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III. DATA DESCRIPTION AND STATISTICS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a description of the dataset used in this thesis and presents 
summary and descriptive statistics. The data description describes the dataset and defines 
the variables used later in the analysis. Summary and descriptive statistics compare 
means and variables from different subsets of the data to better illustrate the data set. 
B. DATA DESCRIPTION 
One of the two datasets utilized in this study was provided by the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC). It was preselected to include only active duty, full-time 
support (FTS) and selected reservists who joined the Navy in five consecutive cohorts 
from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2003. Limited duty officers (LDOs), chief warrant 
officers (CWOs), and officers entering in pay grades above O-1, such as medical, legal 
and religious officers, were not included in the dataset. The data include observation on 
16,143 Navy officers, followed annually from commissioning to the end of fiscal year 
2016 or until separation. This dataset is referred to as the main dataset. 
A subset of this dataset contains information on fitness reports (FITREPs), for a 
total of 8,552 officers. The FITREP dataset is used to examine the performance of service 
members in dual-military marriages. FITREP data consist of an individual’s trait scores, 
trait average, and recommendation for early promotion, along with some administrative 
data. Trait scores, although weighted by the average score of the reporting senior officer, 
do not represent an objective performance measure. Actual scores depend on the 
comparison group of the individual. Within a strong comparison group, the individual’s 
scores eventually drop; within a weaker comparison group, they may rise—although the 
objective performance of an officer may be the same. As shown by Mehay & Bowman 
(2005), the early promotion (EP) recommendation has been previously validated as a 
predictor of job performance. Consequently, EP recommendations from the FITREP 
dataset are used as a performance indicator in this study. 
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An additional data source consists of extracts from the Officer Personnel 
Information System (OPINS). These OPINS extracts were merged with both the main 
and FITREP datasets and used to add a binary variable indicating a dual-military 
marriage as well as household variables such as collocation information, number of 
dependent children, and spouse’s military information. 
Tables 7 and 8 show the distribution of officers in dual-military marriages in the 
main and FITREP datasets, respectively. 
Table 7.  Distribution of Dual-Military Marriages – Main Dataset 
(n = 16.143) 
Table 8.  Distribution of Dual-Military Marriages – FITREP Dataset (n = 
8,552) 
Both tables show even distributions of dual-military marriages in all 
cohorts. Both datasets are representative of the full sample. Dual-military couples make 


























Tables 9 and 10, below, show the distribution of officers by marital status after six 
years of service, after an officer’s first decision is made to either stay in or leave the 
military.  
Table 9.   Main Dataset Distribution of Marital Status by Sixth Year of Service 
(n = 11,198) 
 
Table 10.   FITREP Dataset Distribution of Marital Status by Sixth Year of 
Service (n = 7,350) 
 
 
After six years, the percentage of officers in a dual-military marriage drops to 
4.5% in the main dataset and 4.8% in the FITREP dataset. 
Tables 11 and 12 show the distribution after 10 years of service, that is, after the 
second retention decision is made—the first retention decision considered competitive 








1999 93 1,317 777 2,187
2000 109 1,450 824 2,383
2001 127 1,476 784 2,387
2002 101 1,290 817 2,208
2003 77 1,270 686 2,033








1999 71 936 509 1,516
2000 76 1,028 496 1,600
2001 82 1,020 464 1,566
2002 71 845 460 1,376
2003 53 837 402 1,292
Total 353 4,666 2,331 7,350
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Table 11.   Main Dataset Distribution of Marital Status by 10th Year of Service 
(n = 8,035) 
 
Table 12.   FITREP Dataset Distribution of Marital Status by 10th Year of 
Service (n = 6,091) 
 
 
In both datasets, the percentage of dual-military marriages increases—by 10 years 
of service, 4.9% from the main dataset and 5.1% from the FITREP dataset live in dual-
military marriages. This relative increase could indicate a better overall retention of Navy 
officers in dual-military marriages. These results further indicate that both datasets seem 
to be fairly good representations of the population. 
1. Dependent Variables 
Table 13 lists all the variables used in this study. The dependent variables include 
retention to 10 years of service, promotion to lieutenant commander (O-4), and 
recommendation for early promotion. The first two dependent variables are identified 








1999 76 960 469 1,505
2000 82 1,054 512 1,648
2001 75 1,121 523 1,719
2002 82 1,036 509 1,627
2003 76 1,003 457 1,536








1999 68 829 365 1,262
2000 65 864 393 1,322
2001 53 864 385 1,302
2002 63 758 343 1,164
2003 59 708 274 1,041
Total 308 4,023 1,760 6,091
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Table 13.   Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition
Ten Year Retention =1 if officer stayed in service more than 10 years, else=0
Promoted to O4 =1 if officer got promoted to rank LCDR (O-4), else=0
Percentage of EP Percentage of Early Promotion Recommendations over first 10 YOS (FITREP only)
Demographics
Age Age of the officer at commissioning
Female =1 if Female, else=0
Male =1 if Male, else=0
White =1 if White & NonHispanic, else=0
Black =1 if Black & NonHispanic, else=0
Hispanic =1 if Hispanic, else=0
Asian =1 if Asian, else=0
Unknown Race =1 if Race is not known, else=0
PostGraduate Education =1 if Officer obtained Graduate Education, else=0
Marital Status
Married at Comm. =1 if married at commissioning, else=0
Not Married at Comm. =1 if not married at commissioning, else=0
Dual =1 if ever in a Dual-military marriage, else=0
EverMarried =1 if ever in marriage while in service, else=0
Dual after 6 YOS =1 if in a Dual-military marriage after 6 YOS, else=0
Collocation after 6 YOS =1 if both partners at the same duty station after 6 YOS, else=0
Children after 6 YOS Number of dependent children after 6 YOS
Civ_Mil after 10 YOS =1 if ever married in a Civ-Mil marriage after 10 YOS, else=0
Dual after 10 YOS =1 if ever in a Dual-military marriage after 10 YOS, else=0
Collocation after 10 YOS =1 if both partners at the same duty station after 10 YOS, else=0
Children after 10 YOS Number of dependent children after 10 YOS
Dep_Children_10 =1 if ever had Children by 10 YOS, else=0
Commissioning Source
Naval Academy =1 if commissioned from US Naval Academy, else=0
ROTC =1 if commissioned from ROTC, else=0
OCS/OTS/PLC =1 if commissioned from OCS, else=0
Direct =1 if direct commissioned, else=0
Other Commissioning =1 if other commissioning source, else=0
Unkn Commissioning =1 if unknown commissioned, else=0
Navy Community
SWO =1 if Surface Warfare Officer, else=0
SUB =1 if Submarine Officer, else=0
SPEC =1 if Special Operations Officer, else=0
Aviator =1 if Naval Pilot, else=0
RL/Staff =1 if Restricted Line or Staff Community, else=0
Unqual. Line =1 if Unqualified Line Officer, else=0
Cohort
Cohort_FY99 =1 if commissioning happened in fiscal year 1999, else=0
Cohort_FY00 =1 if commissioning happened in fiscal year 2000, else=0
Cohort_FY01 =1 if commissioning happened in fiscal year 2001, else=0
Cohort_FY02 =1 if commissioning happened in fiscal year 2002, else=0




Ten-year retention is a binary variable, which takes a value of “1” if the officer is 
still in service at 10 years of service, and a value of “0” is the officer separated before the 
10 year of service mark. In contrast to retention at the minimum service requirement 
(MSR) of six years, retention at 10 years of service (YOS) has two unique aspects. 
Someone who retains after 10 YOS will likely stay until being eligible to retire at 20 
YOS. Nevertheless, the Navy keeps only the officers who perform well and whose 
careers seem promising for the remainder of their service obligations. Therefore, the job 
performance is an important determinant for an officer’s retention after 10 YOS. Second, 
someone still in service at ten years is eligible for promotion to O-4. An individual’s 
performance assessment will have an impact on the retention decision. Analyzing 10-year 
retention also indicates to what extent officers in dual-military marriages want to stay on 
active duty. 
Promotion to O-4 is defined as a binary variable, taking a value of “1” if the 
officer were successfully granted promotion to lieutenant commander (O-4), and “0” 
otherwise. Promotions to O-2 and to O-3 are considered almost automatic and relate little 
to performance (Asch & Warner, 2001). Being selected to O-4 is the first competitive 
selection process in a selection board. Officers are ranked, with the promotion 
representing the outcome of the performance assessment. Comparing O-4 promotions of 
officers in dual-military marriages to their peers indicates performance differences 
between these groups. 
Percentage EP measures the percentage of Early Promotion Recommendation 
from all FITREP reports received over the first 10 YOS. This dependent variable is based 
on FITREP scores which are meant to capture job performance. The system of grading 
within a comparison group, however, creates biases; some of these scores (e.g., trait 
scores) are only relative indicators of performance and do not account for objective, 
sortable, and comparable performance evaluations. The one metric that proved sufficient 
and objective is the recommendation for early promotion (EP). Because superior officers 
give out only a limited number of EP recommendations, these are considered a strong 
indicator of high performance. Consequently, EP recommendations are independent from 
previous FITREPs, and the number of recommendations received by an officer over the 
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years is a sound representation of performance. However, the number of FITREPs may 
vary from one officer to another; thus, the percentage of EP recommendations is used in 
this study instead of counts. Percentage of EP is not binary, but a continuous variable, 
that means it can take on any value in range. 
2. Independent Variables 
Table 13 gives an overview of all independent variables used in this study, and 
provides their definitions. Independent variables are the same for both, the main and the 
FITREP datasets.  
The demographics group includes variables such as age, gender, race, and marital 
status. Postgraduate education indicates any education beyond a bachelor’s.  
The marital status variables allow us to identify whether an officer is in a dual-
military and civilian-military marriages at various times, such as commissioning after six 
years and 10 years of service.  
Additional information at these points in time was pulled from the database to 
display the family’s situation: the number of dependent children and the collocation 
variable that indicates whether both spouses live in the same place. Especially in the 
military, it is challenging for both partners to find billets at the same duty station without 
sacrificing career progress. 
Commissioning sources may give the first clue to an officer’s aptitude because 
only the top performing prospects are accepted to attend the Naval Academy. Other 
commissioning sources, however, might be more conducive to starting a family more.  
The Navy community group describes whether an officer is restricted line or staff 
(RL/staff) or unrestricted line (URL) at commissioning. The latter is subdivided into 
surface warfare officers (SWOs), submarine officers (SUBs), special operations (SPECs), 
and aviators. The Navy community variables allow for examining effects of greater 
work–life balance—which is arguably the case in the RL/staff group—on the choice or 
willingness to marry, or even to marry another service member. The opposite could also 
be true—because of the marriage to another service member, an officer may decide to 
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request a lateral transfer—for shore-based duty as is predominantly the case in the staff 
community.  
The cohort dummy variables are binary variables that indicate the commissioning 
year. These cohort variables aim to capture differences in the external factors, e.g., 
change of economic conditions, change in policies, or higher deployment rates, as the 
global war on terror induced at beginning of 2003. 
C. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
This section shows the summary statistics for the full sample of 16,143 officers in 
the main dataset and the sample of 8,552 officers in the FITREP dataset, both comprising 
officers who were commissioned between 1999 and 2003.  
Tables 14 and 15 examine the means of selected dependent and independent 
variables across the full sample and the dual-military marriage sample. Table 14 shows 
the variable means for the full samples. The variable 10-year retention is capturing 
retention for officers who stayed beyond their MSR. The variables promoted to O4 and 
EP Pct at 10 YOS are measured only for officers still in service at 10 years since 
commissioning.  
Both datasets show similar means for the dependent and independent variables; 
thus, both datasets appear to be good representations of the population, and a sampling 
bias seems unlikely. Only the means of the main dataset are discussed in the following 
paragraphs; still, the same pattern appear in the FITREP dataset. 
The full sample includes 18.4% females, and it is predominantly white (75.3 %). 
Only 18.1% of officers in the sample of married at commissioning, which is expected 
given that the typical officer in the sample is 24.8 years old at commissioning. The 
percentage of officers married to another service member at any time from 
commissioning is 11.9%, compared with 57.6% of officers married to a civilian.  
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Table 14.   Variable Means (Full Sample) 
 
 










Ten Year Retention 11,198 0.753 7,350 0.862
Promoted to O4 8,035 0.843 6,157 0.879
EP Pct at 10 YOS 5,989 0.398
Demographics
Age 16,143 24.842 8,552 25.459
Female 16,143 0.184 8,552 0.197
Male 16,143 0.816 8,552 0.803
White (Non Hisp) 16,143 0.753 8,552 0.742
Black (NonHisp) 16,143 0.071 8,552 0.084
Hispanic 16,143 0.094 8,552 0.088
Asian 16,143 0.051 8,552 0.054
Other/Unknown Race 16,143 0.032 8,552 0.032
PostGraduate Education 16,143 0.114 8,552 0.142
Marital Status
Married at Comm. 16,143 0.181 8,552 0.214
Not Married at Comm. 16,143 0.819 8,552 0.786
Dual 16,143 0.119 8,552 0.145
Civ-Mil 16,143 0.576 8,552 0.685
Commissioning 
Naval Acadamy 16,143 0.240 8,552 0.216
ROTC 16,143 0.265 8,552 0.236
OCS/OTS/PLC 16,143 0.324 8,552 0.324
Direct 16,143 0.078 8,552 0.136
Other Commissioning 16,143 0.071 8,552 0.069
Unkn Commissioning 16,143 0.020 8,552 0.019
Navy Community
SWO 16,143 0.233 8,552 0.219
SUB 16,143 0.098 8,552 0.102
SPEC 16,143 0.017 8,552 0.011
Aviator 16,143 0.285 8,552 0.211
RL/STAFF 16,143 0.243 8,552 0.341
Unqual. Line 16,143 0.125 8,552 0.117
Cohort
Cohort_FY99 16,143 0.183 8,552 0.200
Cohort_FY00 16,143 0.208 8,552 0.212
Cohort_FY01 16,143 0.211 8,552 0.215
Cohort_FY02 16,143 0.206 8,552 0.192
Cohort_FY03 16,143 0.192 8,552 0.180
Independent Variables
Main Data Set FITREP Data Set
Dependent Variables
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Ten Year Retention 699 0.750 491 0.845
Promoted to O4 500 0.898 402 0.928
EP Pct at 10 YOS 394 0.400
Demographics
Age 916 24.119 568 24.648
Female 918 0.493 569 0.467
Male 918 0.507 569 0.533
White (Non Hisp) 918 0.771 569 0.764
Black (NonHisp) 918 0.058 569 0.067
Hispanic 918 0.099 569 0.102
Asian 918 0.044 569 0.042
Other/Unknown Race 918 0.028 569 0.025
PostGraduate Education 918 0.076 569 0.079
Married at Comm. 918 0.103 569 0.105
Not Married at Comm. 918 0.897 569 0.895
Married at 6 YOS 699 0.725 491 0.719
Collocation at 6 YOS 699 0.009 491 0.010
Children at 6 YOS 699 0.328 491 0.369
Married at 10 YOS 500 0.782 402 0.774
Collocation at 10 YOS 500 0.054 402 0.037
Children at 10 YOS 500 0.758 402 0.756
Commissioning 
Naval Acadamy 918 0.307 569 0.264
ROTC 918 0.271 569 0.232
OCS/OTS/PLC 918 0.214 569 0.220
Direct 918 0.129 569 0.206
Other Commissioning 918 0.062 569 0.062
Unkn Commissioning 918 0.015 569 0.016
Navy Community
SWO 918 0.248 569 0.230
SUB 918 0.041 569 0.042
SPEC 918 0.010 569 0.005
Aviator 918 0.255 569 0.186
RL/STAFF 918 0.298 569 0.406
Unqual. Line 918 0.147 569 0.130
Cohort
Cohort_FY99 918 0.181 569 0.206
Cohort_FY00 918 0.215 569 0.218
Cohort_FY01 918 0.224 569 0.209
Cohort_FY02 918 0.214 569 0.216
Cohort_FY03 918 0.167 569 0.151
Marital Status and Dependents




In Table 15, average rates of promotion to O4 for officers in dual-military 
marriages are slightly higher than for the full sample, especially in the FITREP sample. 
Overall, the differences do not seem very large. These results are further examined later 
in this study. 
Postgraduate education rates are smaller for those in a dual-military marriage 
(about 8% for the dual-military sample, versus 11% for the full sample). 
Both datasets show the same pattern for dual-military couples over time: from 
commissioning to the minimum service requirement of six years, the percentage increases 
significantly (from 10.4 to 72%). This behavior indicates the preference to marry early in 
one’s career and to stay in service after establishing a dual-military marriage. From six to 
10 years of service, marriage rates increase only slightly (from 72 to 78%) while the 
number of observations drops slightly, too. This drop represents the natural decrease in 
personnel beyond the six- and 10-year retention marks. The relative increase of dual-
military marriages may indicate a greater willingness and/or potential of dual-military 
couples to stay in service. 
One striking finding from the mean table is the collocation variable, which 
identifies whether two officers in a dual-military marriage are stationed in the same 
location. In the two datasets available for this study, the percentage of dual-military 
couples that are in collocation is extremely low: one percent after six years and four to 
five percent after 10 years of service. This situation may have improved, which could be 
reflected with more current data, as the Department of the Navy made effort to address 
this issue (Bureau of Naval Personnel, 2016). 
The distribution of dual-military marriages across officers from different 
commissioning sources shows a larger rate of dual-military marriages among the Naval 
academy graduates (about 29% versus 23% in the full sample).  
Among Navy communities, the SUB and the RL/staff communities stand out. 
Dual-military marriages are fewer in the SUB community (4% in the dual-military 
sample, versus 10% in the full sample). Taking into account the low number of women 
on submarines, this low dual-military percentage appears natural. The RL and staff 
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communities show a higher percentage of dual-military marriages compared to the other 
two groups (30–40% in the dual-military sample, versus 24–34% in the full sample). This 
difference could indicate a better work-life balance—childcare needs and family 
collocation, to name a few—within these communities. 
The cohort variables show that all cohorts are well distributed across the three 
subsamples and represent about 20% of the respective subsample. 
D. DIFFERENCES IN GROUP MEANS 
In this section, two sample t-tests are used to examine statistically significant 
differences in means between groups. 
Table 16 covers the main dataset and displays the differences in 10-year retention 
means for MSR stayers—officers who serve beyond their minimum service requirement 
of six years—and in promotion to O-4 for officers who stayed to 10 years of service. 
Means were compared across three subsamples: dual-military marriages (dual), civilian–
military marriages (civ–mil), and singles. 
Table 16.   Mean Comparison of 10-Year Retention and O4-Promotion Across 
Marital Status Groups (Main Dataset) 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Variable Dual Civ-Mil T-Statistics
Ten Year Retention 0.749 0.794 2.814***
Promoted to O4 0.898 0.854 -2.675***
Variable Dual Single T-Statistics
Ten Year Retention 0.750 0.550 -9.582***
Promoted to O4 0.898 0.724 -7.952***
Variable Civ-Mil Single T-Statistics
Ten Year Retention 0.811 0.509 -26.079***
Promoted to O4 0.860 0.693 -11.777***
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Table 16 shows that in the main dataset, all t-tests are statistically significant at 
the one-percent level.  
A comparison between dual and civ-mil shows only a small difference in the Ten 
Year Retention rates favoring the civ-mil couples. This finding serves as the focus of 
further analysis in this thesis, a shown in the next chapter. That may indicate a lower 
likelihood for both partners to stay in the military, which lowers the burden a dual-
military marriage puts on family life. However, those who stay to 10 YOS see a higher 
promotion rate to O-4 among dual-military couples.  
Table 17 shows the same comparisons of means as Table 16, but for the FITREP 
dataset. In addition, table 17 shows mean comparison for one more dependent variable, 
EP pct at 10 YOS. This variable measures the average recommendation for early 
promotion among those officers who complete 10 years of service. 
Table 17.   Mean Comparison of Dependent Variables Across Marital Status 
Groups (FITREP Dataset) 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
The results in Table 17 support the findings from Table 16 regarding 10-year 
retention and promotion to O-4 rates among officers in a dual-military marriage. The 
comparison between dual-military and civilian-military shows a small difference in the 
Variable Dual Civ-Mil T-Statistics
Ten Year Retention 0.845 0.884 2.566***
Promoted to O4 0.932 0.888 -2.724***
EP_PCT_10yos 0.399 0.400 0.140
Variable Dual Single T-Statistics
Ten Year Retention 0.845 0.731 -5.043***
Promoted to O4 0.932 0.807 -5.788***
EP_PCT_10yos 0.400 0.373  -2.665***
Variable Civ-Mil Single T-Statistics
Ten Year Retention 0.891 0.692 -15.126***
Promoted to O4 0.892 0.787 -6.686***
EP_PCT_10yos 0.402 0.376 -3.432***
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Ten Year Retention rates favoring the civ-mil couples. Promotion to O-4 rate of officers 
in a dual-military marriage is higher among dual-military couples. Officers in dual-
military and civilian-military marriages do not show significant differences in the EP 
recommendation measure. Comparing these two groups against singles, shows significant 
differences in all dependent variable. Ten Year Retention, Promotion to O-4 rates, and EP 
PCT at 10 YOS are all significantly higher for married officers—dual-military and 
civilian-military couples—compared to their single peers. Table 18 shows gender 
differences. 
Table 18.   Mean Comparison of Retention, Promotion, and Early Promotion 
Recommendations for Male and Female Officers Within Dual-Military 
Marriages 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Table 18 shows a significant difference between male and female officers with 
respect to 10-year retention (90.3% for male, and 77.1% for female officers), but 
promotion and early promotion recommendations do not show significant differences 
(about 93% promotion rate to O-4, and about 40% EP recommendations for both 
genders). 
Table 19 displays t-tests for differences in the dependent variable means among 
officers in dual-military marriages stationed at the same location and those stationed at 
different locations. The average rates for all three outcome variables, Ten-year retention, 
Promoted to O4 and EP pct at 10YOS are statistically smaller among the group of 
officers in collocation with their military spouse than officers in dual-military marriage 
not stationed together. 
Variable Male Female T-Statistics
Ten Year Retention 0.903 0.771 -4.053***
Promoted to O4 0.929 0.937 0.308
EP_PCT_10yos 0.403 0.395 -0.497
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Table 19.   Mean Comparison of Retention, Promotion, and Early Promotion 
Recommendations for Officers in Dual-Military Marriages Stationed 
Together and Apart 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Table 20 shows differences among officers in restricted line/staff communities 
and officers in unrestricted line communities living in dual-military marriages. While 
promotion to O-4 appears in favor of RL/staff officers, EP recommendations are 
significantly higher in URL communities. 
Table 20.   Mean Comparison of Retention, Promotion, and Early Promotion 
Recommendations for Officers in RL/Staff Communities vs. Officers in 
URL Communities Within Dual-Military Marriages 
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduces the selected datasets, comprising more than 16,000 
officers and more than 8,500 officers, respectively, and the dependent and independent 
variables used in this study.  
Next, Chapter IV uses multivariate regression analysis to examine what factors 
are most likely to explain differences in retention, promotion and EP recommendations 
among officers in dual military marriage as compared with those married to a civilian or 
those who are not married. 
Variable Collocation_10 No_Colloc_10 T-Statistics
Ten Year Retention 1.000 0.840 -1.685*
Promoted to O4 0.933 0.932 -0.016
EP_PCT_10yos 0.439 0.398 -1.0110
Variable RL/Staff URL T-Statistics
Ten Year Retention 0.816 0.862 1.372
Promoted to O4 0.972 0.910 -2.370**
EP_PCT_10yos 0.373 0.414 2.594***
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter uses regression techniques to examine the relation between dual-
military marriage and other factors, and the job performance of Navy officers. 
When modeling 10-year retention and promotion to O-4 outcomes, which are 
measured by binary variables, the multivariate regressions used are probit regression 
models. The estimated coefficients in a standard probit regression model indicate whether 
the coefficient is statistically significant and its sign, not the magnitudes of these relation 
between the independent and dependent variable. Statistical software STATA provided 
the opportunity to choose a differential probit regression to show partial derivatives of 
each independent variable in the model, thus giving statistical significance, direction (+/-) 
and magnitude (marginal effects). Partial derivatives provide marginal effects of a one-
unit change in a given independent variable on the outcome measured by the dependent 
variable (Wooldridge, 2013). 
When modeling the dependent variable EP percentage at 10 YOS, which is a 
continuous variable an ordinary least square (OLS) estimation model is used. 
(Wooldridge, 2013). 
B. REGRESSION MODELS 
In both, the probit and OLS estimation models, the key independent variables 
include marital status and gender, and the control independent variable groups include 
other demographics, commissioning source, Navy community, and cohort dummies. 
Unless stated otherwise, the control group for every model is male, single, white, no 
dependents, OCS, Bachelor’s degree, SWO, and commissioned in cohort FY99.  
1. Ten-Year Retention 
After deciding not to leave service at the minimum service requirement (MSR), 
an officer’s next retention decision is usually made at the 10-year mark. Surely, not all 
officers want to stay in service, but retention at 10 years is assumed the first outcome of a 
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competitive board decision and, thus, can be used as suggestive of performance. The first 
model estimates the probability an officer decides to stay in service after this 10-year 
mark. Model 1 tests for any factors that could potentially influence the decision to stay as 
well as for factors that could lead to better performance and, consequently, to the Navy 
accepting the officer’s request to stay in service. 
Model 1 uses the main dataset. In order to allow all observations to realize all 
possible outcomes, the sample was restricted to those officers who stayed beyond the 
MSR (= “MSR stayers”). Thus, the model represents the decision to stay past MSR, at 
the 10-year mark and the Navy’s subsequent acceptance. Figure 2 shows the model.  
 
Figure 2.  Ten-Year Retention Model (Model 1) 
The demographics group consists of age, gender, race, and education. The age 
variable is included to capture differences in retention between those who are prior-
enlisted and those who are not. Since the prior-enlisted variable was not well-populated 
in the dataset, age was used as a proxy instead. Female and male dummy variables were 
set to capture any differences between male and female officers, and to address the 
primary research question. Race and education variables were included to control for any 
effects by different race/ethnicity backgrounds. The variables in the marital group 
represent the focus of this study: they are meant to examine how marital status, the type 
of spouse (military or civilian), collocation and dependent children are related with job 
performance. The remaining variable groups—commissioning source, Navy community, 
and cohort year—were included as control variables to capture differences within these 
groups.  
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Table 21 shows the results of the 10-year retention model. The sample contains 
11,168 observations due to eliminating officers who did not stay in service after six years 
(MSR). Table 21 displays the results for the full sample. 
Table 21.   Ten-Year Retention (MSR Stayers, Full Sample) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
The results of Model 1 show an average ten-year retention rate of 75.4% for all 
MSR stayers in the sample. Female officers have a 4.7 percentage points (6.2%) lower 
probability of 10-year retention as compared with male officers. 
Marital status variables are a particular focus of this study. The coefficients on 
dual-military and civilian–military marriage dummy variables are both statistically 
significant, showing that officers in such marriages are 7.1 percentage points (9.4%) and 
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5.1 percentage points (6.8%), respectively, more likely to stay in service than single (not 
married) officers. In this model, officers who have dependent children at 10 years of 
service stay in service longer, by 26.3 percentage points (34.9%), than officers with no 
dependent children. The coefficient on Collocation was not presented results; due to the 
small number of couples in collocation this variable had to be dropped from the 
estimations.  
Age at commissioning has a significant and positive coefficient, showing that for 
each additional year, the retention increases by 1.5 percentage points (2%). Race/ 
ethnicity variables show only small magnitudes and are all insignificant, showing that 
race/ethnic groups’ retention rates are no different than those of white officers. An officer 
who has obtained graduate education is 3.5 percentage points (4.6%) more likely to stay 
beyond 10 years of service than those without advanced degrees.  
Differences in ten-year retention rates among officers from different 
commissioning sources are not statistically different. Within URL communities, only the 
submarine community shows strong significant, and negative, behavior. An officer in the 
submarine community is 15.4 percentage points (20.4%) less likely to retain beyond 10 
years of service.  
Among the entry cohorts, officers commissioned in 2002 and 2003 show larger 
ten-year retention rates compared with those commission in FY99. As Table 21 shows, 
both cohorts have about seven percentage points (9.3%) higher ten-year retention rates 
compared with officers from the fy99 cohort. One possible explanation could be the 
2007–2008 Great Recession and the following decline in job opportunities outside the 
military, which may have made officers more likely to stay beyond their MSRs and, 
subsequently, to 10 years of service. 
To further examine the scope to marital status factors and to measure differences 
in retention rates among officers married to a civilian, and officers married to a service 
member, the ten-year retention model was estimated within the sub-samples of officers 
who were married at any point from commissioning to 10 YOS, by gender. The 
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comparison groups now consist of white, no dependents, civilian-military marriage, OCS, 
Bachelor’s degree, SWO, and cohort FY99. Table 22 shows the estimated coefficients. 
Table 22.   Ten-Year Retention (MSR Stayers, Married, by Gender) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
The average probability of ten-year retention rates for married female and married 
male officers is 75.1 and 81.4%, respectively. 
The coefficients on the dual-military marriage dummy variable shows that female 
officers married to a military spouse are 8.4 percentage points (11.2 %) less likely to 
retain at the 10 year mark, as compared with the female officers married to a civilian.  
However, among male officers, the dual-military marital status appears to be not a 
penalty, but rather an advantage in terms of ten-year retention rate, as compared with the 
male officers married to a civilian. Male officers in a dual-military marriage, have a 2.5 
percentage points (3.1%) higher retention rate than male officers in a civilian-military 
marriage. The small number of female officers in a civilian-military marriage might enter 
Female Married Male Married Female Married Male Married
VARIABLES (Marginal Effects) (Marginal Effects) VARIABLES (Marginal Effects) (Marginal Effects)
0.0058 0.0069*** -0.3209** 0.0004
(0.0044) (0.0017) (0.1494) (0.0331)
0.0997*** -0.0101 omitted -0.1269***
(0.0344) (0.0190) (0.0212)
0.0488 -0.0027 omitted 0.0249
(0.0406) (0.0148) (0.0257)
0.0421 0.0179 -0.0371 -0.0124
(0.0469) (0.0186) (0.0426) (0.0122)
0.1207*** 0.0466** -0.0099 0.0065
(0.0459) (0.0184) (0.0398) (0.0149)
-0.0100 0.0229* 0.0268 -0.0254
(0.0473) (0.0127) (0.0478) (0.0176)
0.2784*** 0.2972*** 0.0639* -0.0067
(0.0235) (0.0092) (0.0343) (0.0125)
-0.0840*** 0.0251** 0.0248 -0.0010
(0.0255) (0.0124) (0.0380) (0.0129)
-0.0748 0.0030 0.1191*** 0.0355***
(0.0566) (0.0129) (0.0317) (0.0120)
-0.0987** 0.0133 0.1158*** 0.0386***
(0.0480) (0.0112) (0.0328) (0.0126)
-0.0746 0.0196
(0.0489) (0.0210)
0.0109 0.0216 Observations 1,062 7,814
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a small-sample bias in the estimated coefficients; the findings need to be further validated 
by larger sample sizes.  
Among the demographic variables, age is no longer a significant factor in 
predicting ten-year retention rates for married female officers, but it is for married male 
officers. The magnitude of age coefficient for men is rather small (0.7 percentage points 
increased retention rates for officers one year older).  
Having dependent children by 10 years of service has a strong positive association 
with the 10-year retention rate for female officers (27.8 percentage points) and male 
officers (29.7 percentage points) in a dual-military marriage, compared to the retention 
rates for officers married to a civilian.  
Black female officers married to a military spouse have a 9.97 percentage point 
higher ten-year retention compared with white female officers in a dual-military 
marriage. All other race variables are insignificant, for both genders. 
Among Navy communities, submarine and special warfare communities are 
omitted from this regression due to the small number of observations. As all warfare 
areas have opened to women recently, newer data are expected to yield different results. 
All other variables show similar behavior as in the previous regression of the full sample. 
2. Promotion to O-4 
Once the Navy accepts an officer to enter active service as an ensign (O-1), the 
next two promotions are considered “quasi-automatic” (Asch & Warner, 2005). That is, if 
an officer is eligible, he or she will get promoted in time. These promotions are not 
considered competitive as the Navy’s manpower structure requires a decent number of O-
2s and O-3s to populate the lower leading positions with officers possessing a necessary 
minimum of experience.  Promotions to the rank of lieutenant commander (O-4), 
however, are competitive. The so-called “up or out” system requires promotions to be 
considered for retention.  
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Similar to Model 1, the sample used for estimating the promotion to O-4 models 
was restricted to officers who were still in service at 10 years of service because only 
those officers are eligible for promotion to O-4.  
In Model 2, promotion to O-4 is the dependent variable, while the independent 
variable groups remain as in Model 1. Figure 3 shows the model. 
 
Figure 3.  Promotion to O-4 Model (Model 2) 
Table 23 shows the results of the promotion model. The sample consists of 8,014 
observations for the full sample (married and not married), and 6,838 observations for the 
married sample.  
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Table 23.   Promotion to O-4 (10-Year Stayers, Full Sample and Married 
Subsample) 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
The average promotion probability is 84.3% for the full sample, and 86.3% for 
married officers. There is no significant difference in promotion rates among males and 
females.  
Officers in dual-military and civilian-military marriage show significantly better 
promotion outcomes than singles, with retention rates of 5.16 percentage points (6.1%) 
and 3.89 percentage points  (4.6%) higher promotion rates than not married officers. 
However, among married officers, officers in dual-military marriage show no significant 
difference in promotion rates compared to promotion rates for officers married to a 
civilian.  
Having dependent children at 10 years of service is associated with a significantly 
higher promotion outcome—by 3.1 percentage points (3.7%) for the married officers, 
Full Sample Married sample Full Sample Married sample
VARIABLES (Marginal Effects) (Marginal Effects) VARIABLES (Marginal Effects) (Marginal Effects)
-0.0024* -0.0028* -0.0422** -0.0298
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0182) (0.0182)
0.0103 0.0053 0.0010 0.0048
(0.0121) (0.0136) (0.0217) (0.0207)
-0.0420** -0.0184 -0.0252 -0.0216
(0.0164) (0.0158) (0.0177) (0.0174)
0.0011 0.0068 0.0590*** 0.0573***
(0.0153) (0.0155) (0.0198) (0.0185)
-0.0304 -0.0301 -0.0384*** -0.0312***
(0.0196) (0.0215) (0.0116) (0.0116)
-0.0011 0.0076 0.0713*** 0.0635***
(0.0218) (0.0212) (0.0112) (0.0110)
-0.0235* -0.0158 0.0040 -0.0020
(0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0176) (0.0180)
0.0308*** 0.0254*** -0.0119 -0.0151
(0.0089) (0.0084) (0.0153) (0.0156)
0.0516*** 0.0125 -0.0483*** -0.0403**
(0.0108) (0.0116) (0.0164) (0.0166)
0.0389*** -0.1130*** -0.1007***
(0.0101) (0.0185) (0.0192)
-0.0350** -0.0276* -0.3886*** -0.3768***
(0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0233) (0.0258)
-0.0414*** -0.0393***
(0.0127) (0.0129)
-0.0895*** -0.0863*** Observations 8,014 6,838
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compared with not married officers, and by 2.5 percentage points (3.0%) for the officers 
in a dual-military marriage compared with officers in a civilian-military marriage.  
Among the demographic variables, only the black race variable is significant, 
showing that black officers are 4.2 percentage points (5.0%) less likely to promote to O-4 
than white officers. All other demographic variables are insignificant in estimating 
promotion outcomes. 
All commissioning sources show lower promotion outcomes than officer 
candidate school (OCS). Among Navy communities, special warfare and RS/staff 
communities show higher promotion outcomes than the SWO community in both the full 
and married samples.  
While in the retention model, cohort years 2002 and 2003 showed positive 
coefficients, promotion outcomes were negatively associated with commissioning cohort 
years 2001, 2002, and 2003. The Great Recession, with shifted retention behavior, could 
be the reason; more officers wanted to stay in service during that time. Thus, the pool of 
eligible officer may have increased, and subsequently, promotion rates decreased. This 
effect can be found in both, the full and the married, samples. 
The promotion outcomes are further examined for the subsamples for married 
female and male officers. Table 24 shows the estimated coefficients of these models. The 
samples were restricted to those who stayed at least until the 10-year mark. The 
comparison group consists of white officers, with no dependents, in civilian-military 
marriages, with OCS, Bachelor’s degree, in the SWO community, and commissioned in 
FY99. The number of observations for the married male subsample is 6,082; for married 
females, the subsample is only 731. 
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Table 24.   Promotion to O-4 (10-Year Stayers, Female Married and Male 
Married Subsamples) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
The mean promotion rate for the female married subsample is 88%; for the male 
married subsample, it is 86%. Because officers who stay beyond 10 years of service are 
reviewed for promotion to O-4, these high rates are not surprising. 
Among married officers, those in a dual-military marriage have no different 
promotion rates as compared to those in a civilian-military marriage.  In the marital 
variables group, dependent children at 10 YOS were significant for married men. Married 
men who have children at 10 YOS are 2.4 percentage points (2.8%) more likely to 
promote to O-4 than those without dependent children.  
All demographic variables show no significance regarding promotion outcomes. 
The coefficients show significantly lower promotion outcomes with ROTC-
commissioned officers for both subsamples (10 and 3.1 percentage points, respectively), 
compared to officers commissioned through OCS. Among Navy communities, men in 
dual-military marriage are more likely to promote in the special warfare (6.3 percentage 
Female Married Male Married Female Married Male Married
VARIABLES (Marginal Effects) (Marginal Effects) VARIABLES (Marginal Effects) (Marginal Effects)
-0.0098*** -0.0009 0.0144 0.0054
(0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0599) (0.0216)
-0.0277 -0.0138 omitted -0.0149
(0.0330) (0.0174) (0.0173)
0.0320 0.0024 -0.2194 0.0633***
(0.0325) (0.0171) (0.3080) (0.0178)
0.0057 -0.0372 -0.1395** -0.0223*
(0.0446) (0.0239) (0.0545) (0.0120)
omitted -0.0067 0.0668* 0.0625***
(0.0242) (0.0342) (0.0116)
0.0062 -0.0197 0.0273 -0.0063
(0.0316) (0.0131) (0.0443) (0.0193)
0.0260 0.0244*** 0.0636** -0.0285
(0.0222) (0.0090) (0.0285) (0.0174)
0.0015 0.0172 -0.0360 -0.0390**
(0.0212) (0.0134) (0.0412) (0.0179)
-0.0905 -0.0163 -0.0167 -0.1143***
(0.0608) (0.0144) (0.0398) (0.0212)
-0.0992** -0.0306** -0.1470** -0.4102***
(0.0482) (0.0133) (0.0609) (0.0277)
-0.0510 -0.1181***
(0.0452) (0.0307)
-0.0238 -0.0297 Observations 731 6,082
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points) and RL/staff communities (6.3 percentage points) compared with men in civilian-
military marriage. However, they are less likely to promote in the aviator community 
compared to the SWO community. Similarly, women in dual-military marriage are more 
likely to promote in the RL/staff communities (6.7 percentage points, 7.6%) but less 
likely in the aviator community (14.0 percentage points, 15.9%) compared with women 
in civilian-military marriage. Officers commissioned in cohort year 2003 show 
significantly lower promotion rates for both subsamples (14.7 and 41.0 percentage points, 
respectively) compared with the officers commissioned in fiscal year 1999.  
The low number of observations may affect the reliability of this model, 
particularly for the female married subsample. Results, however, are in line with findings 
form earlier research by Maugeri (2016).   
3. Early Promotion Recommendation 
As discussed in Chapter II, various FITREP scores are recorded. Among the 
variables, the EP recommendation is considered the most unbiased performance score in 
the Navy’s current fitness reporting system (Mehay, 2005).  
FITREP data are available for a subset of the full data. In this section, the EP Pct 
to 10 YOS model results are presented. As in Model 2, the sample for this model was 
restricted to officers who stayed at least until the 10-year mark. The sample contains 
5,978 observations and follows the same independent variable groups. The percentage of 
EP recommendations, EP pct to 10 YOS, is the dependent variable is a continuous 
variable; therefore, this model uses an OLS regression instead of a probit regression 
utilized for the previous binary variables. Figure 4 shows the EP Pct to 10 YOS estimates. 
 
Figure 4.  Early Promotion Recommendation Model (Model 3) 
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In Model 3, the same independent variable groups as in Models 1 and 2 were 
used.. The comparison groups consisted of male, white, no dependents, single, OCS, 
Bachelor’s degree, SWO, and cohort FY99, unless stated otherwise. 
Table 25 shows the results of the EP recommendation model. The average 
promotion probability is 39.8% for the full sample (married and not married officers). 
Table 25.   Early Promotion Recommendation Percentage 
(10-Year Stayers, Full Sample) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
Full sample Full sample
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Female officers show a significantly lower percentage of EP recommendations, 
by 2.69 percent, compared with male officers. 
 Officers in a dual-military marriage are 1.63 percent more likely to receive a 
higher percentage of EP recommendations, compared with single officers.  
Among demographic variables, age, and graduate education have significant 
coefficients. Age is negatively related to EP recommendations; however, with 0.2%, the 
magnitude is rather small. Postgraduate education increases the percentage of EP 
recommendation rate by 1.8 percentage. 
Having dependent children is associated with a slightly decreased percentage of 
EP recommendations, by 0.9 percent. Interestingly, being in a dual-military marriage 
increase the probability of receiving a recommendation by 1.6% compared to those not 
married, while those in a civilian-military marriage have no differences in EP 
recommendation rates as compared with single officers. While Models 1 and 2 had the 
same significance and same direction for the dependent children coefficients in the full 
sample, the dependent children coefficient in Model 3 is the first indication of a 
difference between dual-military and civilian-military marriages and is further examined 
in the next run of this model with different subsamples.  
Table 26 shows the results of the EP recommendation model limited to the sample 
of all married officers, and including an interaction term for female officers in dual-
military marriages. 
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Table 26.   Early Promotion Recommendation Percentage 
(10-Year Stayers, Pooled Married Sample) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Including an interaction term between dual-military and female in the EP Pct to 
10 YOS model estimated for the married officers sample, showed a significant and 
positive coefficient on the interaction term. Thus, female officers in dual-military 
marriages show a higher EP recommendation rate than their male counterparts. 
All included commissioning sources show significantly lower EP 
recommendation rates than for officers commissioning from OCS. The following Navy 
communities show significantly higher outcomes than the SWO community: submarine 
(7.2%), special warfare (4.9%), and RL/staff (3.6%). The magnitudes of these 
coefficients leave the SWO community with a considerably lower chance of getting EP 
recommendations. Only the coefficient on aviators is not significant, confirming the 
findings of Models 1 and 2, and sharing the lower recommendation rate with SWOs. The 
cohort coefficients also confirm findings from Models 1 and 2. Cohort years 2002 and 
2003 show significantly lower recommendation rates, by 1.7% and 2.6%, respectively, as 
compared with cohort 1999. 
For more specific differences by marital status, the sample was restricted to 
female and male married officers, and both subsamples estimated by gender. Table 26 













All other control variables included, but not shown
Female in Dual-Military
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Dual-Mil Marriage at 10YOS
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The mean EP recommendation rates were 37% for the female married subset, and 
40.7% for the male married subset. The female married sample contains 632 observations 
and the male married sample has 4,584 observations. 
Table 27 show the EP recommendation model for the married female and married 
male subsamples. 
Table 27.   Early Promotion Recommendation Percentage (10-Year Stayers, 
Female Married and Male Married Subsamples) 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
The marital status variable group yields interesting results. Unlike the results in 
Models 1 and 2, the coefficient on dependent children at 10 YOS is insignificant for both 
samples, married females and married males. Here, children are not a marker for EP 
recommendation outcomes of married officers. Being in a dual-military marriage 
improves the EP recommendation rate of female married officers by 2.9% over female 
officers in civilian-military marriages. Male officers in dual-military marriage have no 
different rates of EP recommendations when compared with male officers in civilian-
military marriage. Female officers appear to benefit in some way by being in a dual-
Female Married Male Married Female Married Male Married
VARIABLES (Marginal Effects) (Marginal Effects) VARIABLES (Marginal Effects) (Marginal Effects)
-0.0030 -0.0019** -0.0798 -0.0184
(0.0020) (0.0008) (0.0578) (0.0169)
-0.0038 -0.0009 omitted 0.0749***
(0.0182) (0.0087) (0.0083)
0.0191 0.0110 -0.0449 0.0545***
(0.0243) (0.0083) (0.1675) (0.0178)
-0.0260 -0.0083 0.0275 0.0049
(0.0289) (0.0111) (0.0275) (0.0066)
0.0226 -0.0135 -0.0042 0.0433***
(0.0349) (0.0126) (0.0199) (0.0071)
0.0163 0.0181*** 0.0527 0.0023
(0.0204) (0.0063) (0.0338) (0.0093)
-0.0137 -0.0037 0.0146 -0.0083
(0.0144) (0.0048) (0.0207) (0.0068)
0.0293** -0.0073 0.0190 -0.0143**
(0.0135) (0.0079) (0.0215) (0.0070)
-0.0731** -0.0083 -0.0073 -0.0146**
(0.0302) (0.0077) (0.0221) (0.0073)
-0.0713*** -0.0134** 0.0279 -0.0303***
(0.0219) (0.0066) (0.0239) (0.0080)
-0.1205*** -0.0401*** 0.4884*** 0.4539***
(0.0205) (0.0095) (0.0585) (0.0227)
-0.0685** -0.0113
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military marriage. Reasons for this somewhat counterintuitive result are unknown, and 
worthy of further study. Potential reasons accounting for such a finding are manifold. 
Following a traditional family view, responsibility for childcare and other family 
concerns usually lies with the mother. Thus, for men, it might make little difference 
whether the wives are working in the military or in a civilian job. For women, however, 
having a more “understanding” spouse, may positively change the quality of life, allow a 
greater focus on job responsibilities, and subsequently improve job performance. Other 
reasons could be subconscious career competition with their military spouse, willful 
support of the wife’s career progress by the husband, or a sort of selection bias when 
male and female service members consider becoming a couple. 
Demographic variables in these models show insignificant coefficients of race/ 
ethnicity variables. Holding everything else constant, officers with postgraduate 
education have increased recommendation rates, by 1.8% among male officers married to 
a military spouse compared to male officers married to a civilian spouse. In the female 
married subsample, the magnitude of postgraduate education is the same, but the 
coefficient is insignificant, probably because the small sample size could not establish 
significance. 
Further coefficients for commissioning source, Navy community, and cohort 
follow patterns similar to those in Models 1 and 2. Included commissioning sources show 
lower recommendation rates compared to the excluded OCS commissioning. As in the 
full sample, the following communities are significantly higher for married male officers: 
submarine (7.5%), special warfare (5.5%), and RL/staff (4.3%). For married female 
officers, all Navy communities are insignificant. The same effects were found for the 
cohort variable group; cohort years 2001 (1.4%), 2002 (1.5%), and 2003 (3.0%) were 
significantly lower for men while insignificant for women. These insignificant findings, 
again, could be a result of the small sample size for female married officers (n = 632). 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The Navy initiated a set of talent-management actions to recruit, train, and retain 
talented personnel and to maintain a diverse force (Department of the Navy, 2015). The 
Navy’s leadership is particularly interested in better understanding how to identify talent 
and how high-quality personnel make labor-supply decisions. Understanding job 
performance is crucial in managing high-quality personnel, supporting these individuals, 
retaining them, and eventually promoting them to senior leadership positions. 
After the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) found in 2011 that 
women were underrepresented in senior leadership positions and faced lower promotion 
rates, the military services increased their efforts to achieve gender equality and equity. 
Subsequent research validated lower retention rates among female Navy  
officers (Mundell, 2016). Identifying, explaining, and addressing causal factors for 
gender differences in promotion and retention are difficult tasks at best and the focus of 
continuing research. The present study attempts to contribute to this growing base of 
information and understanding. 
In 2005, Mehay and Bowman examined the connection between performance and 
marital status. The authors found significantly higher performance ratings among married 
men compared to single men in the military. When examining the SWO community, 
Kraus et al. (2013) supported these findings by showing significantly higher retention 
among married men with children, but they did not find a similar correlation for married 
female SWOs. Asch et al. (2012) also substantiated the finding of lower promotion and 
retention rates for female officers. 
Since Mundell (2016) had previously examined female officer retention decisions, 
the present study sought to investigate the performance aspect, particularly within a dual-
military marriage. As stated above, it was hypothesized initially that the retention and job 
performance of female officers in a dual-military marriage would differ significantly 
from that of officers in the comparison groups. These differences were expected due to 
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the increased demands of military service likely experienced by dual-military couples, 
and particularly among wives who might have more competing family responsibilities. 
The present study employed three different models to explore this hypothesis and 
determine the correlation between productivity and dual-military marriages.  
The 10-year retention model supports previous research findings, showing lower 
retention rates among female service members. Dual-military marriage status is 
associated with higher retention among male, but not among female officers. At the same 
time, this finding does not answer the question of whether lower performance leads to 
lower retention. 
The second model, using promotion to O-4 as one possible performance indicator, 
does not find significant effects of dual-military marriages when compared with civilian-
military marriages. This result may suggest that promotion to O-4 is not influenced to any 
greater degree, positively or negatively, by being in either a dual-military or civilian-
military marriage. An alternative explanation is that Navy policies are effective in 
neutralizing dual-military issues or stressors that could affect an officer’s chances for 
promotion to O-4. 
The third model relies on a FITREP dataset and is meant to examine performance 
as captured in Navy FITREPs. Previous research suggests that a recommendation for 
early promotion (EP) is the most unbiased indicator of a member’s performance. Since 
this variable was available in the FITREP dataset, it was used to create the EP 
recommendation model. The model shows significantly higher percentage of EP 
recommendation for officers in a dual-military marriage compared with single officers, 
and for female officers in a dual-military marriage compared with female officers in a 
civilian-military marriage. In contrast, male officers in a dual-military marriage show no 
significant difference in EP recommendation rates when compared with those of male 
officers married to a civilian spouse. A possible explanation for this gender difference 
could be better intra-family support for the serving woman. 
Data analysis suggests that women in a dual-military marriage exhibit higher 
performance when compared with their male counterparts. Female officers show a lower 
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percentage of EP recommendations compared with male officers. However, among the 
married officers, female officers in dual-military marriage show a higher percent of EP 
recommendations than males in dual-military marriage. Due to the small sample size, 
these findings will have to be validated in future research, using large data sets. 
Having dependent children and working in a RL/staff community, which is 
usually viewed as having better work-life balance, likely are not associated with 
differences in performance, as measured by EP recommendations. In addition to dual-
military marriages, commissioning source is the only other variable found to relate 
significantly with performance. Officers commissioned through officer candidate school 
(OCS) receive the best average performance scores. This finding cannot be explained 
with the data used for the present study. However, it should be noted that the magnitude 
of difference is small across all commissioning sources. Further research could help to 
determine whether there is an actual impact of commissioning source on an officer’s job 
performance and what might explain the observed relationship. 
Based on earlier research, restricted line and staff communities were expected to 
show higher retention rates and performance because of better quality of life, higher 
motivation, and better performance. This expectation was confirmed for the full sample 
models but did not show significance among dual-military married officers. The SWO 
community shows the lowest performance outcomes on average across all communities 
in this study. Submarine and special warfare communities show some significance but 
still have inherent power issues because women were not allowed in these communities 
until recently. Future research with more recent data may provide better insight into the 
dynamics of performance outcomes within these communities. From these data, 
community does not play a role in estimating the actual performance of a Navy officer. 
As a general remark, limiting the sample of 16,143 officer observations to married 
women leaves the researcher with small sample sizes. While still being able to establish 
statistical significance and draw conclusions, results in the present study may look 
different from those using another dataset.  
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B. LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
One of the limitations of this study stems from possible endogeneity caused by a 
correlation between the variables of 10-year retention and promotion to O-4. Both happen 
in the same period of an officer’s career. Therefore, decisions for both are made nearly at 
the same time, and the perceived chance of being promoted may influence an officer’s 
retention decision. To address this issue, research could be conducted using different 
models to further detail or narrow down factors for retention decisions. 
Data clearly indicate a higher retention potential among married service members. 
The same holds true on average for service members in a dual-military marriage. Navy 
policies that incentivize marriages and support married personnel are assumed 
appropriate for increasing retention rates. Gender differences within dual-military 
marriages exist but are not related to performance. Additional performance modeling 
suggests significantly higher performance among married women in a dual-military 
marriage when compared with that of their male counterparts. Thus, policies that foster 
dual-military marriages may be suitable for increasing female officer performance—and, 
subsequently, the retention and promotion of this group—without affecting significantly 
the performance of male officers. 
Another limitation is the small sample size of female married officers. In recent 
years, the Navy has opened more and more communities to women, so more recent data 
could result in bigger samples and more resilient results. Findings in this thesis are 
statistically significant, but further research should be conducted to support these findings 
before planning or establishing policies as previously mentioned. 
One other factor tested in this study was collocation, that is, when both partners in 
a dual-military marriage are assigned to the same duty-station or to different duty-stations 
close to each other. Such a constellation helps reduce weekly commuting and provides 
the opportunity for both partners to be with the family frequently. However, the present 
study finds no impact of collocation on performance indicators—apparently dual-military 
couples find ways to address issues without being at the same location and without 
having an impact on job performance. Another reason for not finding effects may be the 
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extremely small number of actual collocation data. Further research with better data 
could look more thoroughly into the stationing of dual-military couples while controlling 
for external factors.  
As discussed in Chapter II, dual-military marriages are prone to face family 
shocks, such as deployments or parents stationed in different geographical locations, 
more often than civilian-military marriages. To retain quality personnel from dual-
military marriages, the Navy needs to make sure that these family shocks do not occur 
considerably more often than in civilian-military marriages. For example, coordination of 
projected rotation dates for both partners in conjunction with the aforementioned 
collocation policy (NAVPERSCOM, 2015) could reduce stress caused by families not 
living in the same location.  
In summary, the present study suggests that female Navy officers in a dual-
military marriage are significantly less likely, on average, than officers in several 
comparison groups to stay in the Navy during the first ten years. The reasons for these 
comparatively lower retention rates are unclear. At the same time, evidence suggests that 
female Navy officers in a dual-military marriage who remain in the Navy are not 
hindered generally from performing at least as well as, or even higher than, their male 
counterparts—tending to merit promotion at a rate similar to or exceeding that of their 
peers. To achieve gender equality, the Navy needs to ensure that talented female officers 
are willing and able to stay in service. Clearly, retention is the first prerequisite for 
officers, regardless of gender or marital status, to perform well later in their careers. 
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